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Trusts- Power of a Trustee to Grant Leases Extending Be-
yond the Probable Period of a Testamentary Trust-Plaintiff, in
his capacity as trustee under a testamentary trust, had with permission
of the circuit court leased trust property to the defendant for a term
of 15 years. While the lease had more than six years to run, the entire
beneficial interest in the trust vested in one Walter Widmann who made
a voluntary assignment of his interest to plaintiff. Plaintiff thereafter
immediately petitioned for termination of the trust and an order of
termination was entered. Plaintiff then brought an unlawful detainer
action against the defendant lessee, contending that, since the trust-had
terminated, the lease had also terminated. Held: A trustee may make a
lease extending beyond the trust period if, in so doing, he thereby gives
effect to the intent of the testator. Smith v. Widrnann Hotel Co.,
49 N.W. 2d 301 (So. Dak., 1951).
The problem of the principal case appears to arise only where the
testator has not expressly limited the term for which a trustee may
lease trust property, and where the trust period is indefinite because it is
measured by the life of a person who has the beneficial interest. Where
the trust has been set up with an express termination date, it seems to
be an apparently universal rule that a lease extending beyond that date
is invalid as to the excess on the principle that such a lease would be
contrary to the testator's intention as shown in the express terms of the
trust.:
The problem raised in the principal case can arise in two different
fact situations: where the trustee at the time of executing the lease
attempts to limit the lease to the probable period of the trust estate and
where the trustee attempts to lease for a period which in all probability
will extend beyond the duration of the trust estate.2
In regard to leases of trust property where the trustee at the time of
execution of the lease attempted to limit the lease to the probable period
of the trust extate by recourse to mortality tables and court advice there
are two views as to the validity of the lease as against remaindermen if
in fact the trust estate should terminate prematurely. Under the strict
view the lease terminates immediately upon termination of the trust
estate.3 It seems that the courts following this view lay down the rule
that any lease, even though based upon the probable termination date
of the trust, which in fact does extend beyond the trust period is un-
reasonable. This view has been modified in New York4 and Pennsyl-
'Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N.W. 5, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1004
(1913); annotation, 61 A.L.R. 1369 (1920); 26 R.C.L. 1303 (1920).
2 In re Hubbel, 135 Iowa 637, 113 N.W. 512, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 496, 14 Ann.
Cas. 640 (1907).
3 Gomez v. Gomez, 147 N.Y. 195, 41 N.E. 420 (1895).
4 NEvW YORK REAL PROP. CODE, Sec. 106 (1923).
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vania5 by statutes which provides that a trustee having the power to
lease trust property may lease for a period of five years and such lease
will not be rendered invalid by reason of the termination of the trust
estate before the expiration of the five year period. These statutes have
been held to enlarge powers of the trustee to make leases but where
the lease is for a period longer than five years and the trust estate termi-
nates prior to the lease the excess will be void as to the remaindermen 6
The other view holds that where the lease is based upon the probable
termination date of the trust and the trust terminates prematurely the
lease will still be valid for that reasonable period. 7 Under this view the
remaindermen take the property encumbered by the lease until that time
when they could have reasonably expected to have received the property
had the trust not terminated prematurely. Under this view the actual
period of the trust does not determine whether the lease is reasonable or
not, but reasonableness is determined primarily by the probable duration
of the trust estate, when the lease was executed."
Under both of the above views, where the lease, at the time of
execution, will extend beyond the probable period of the trust, the
portion of the lease remaining after the trust terminates is void as to
the remaindermen. That is, under both the strict and more liberal views,
such a lease is considered unreasonable in a majority of jurisdictions.9
This majority rule is based upon the principal that the trustee is intended
only to have the power to make a reasonable lease of trust property and,
per se, a lease which is likely to extend beyond the trust period is
unreasonable."
The Restatement of Trusts" sets down the rule that the trustee has
the power to make a reasonable lease and, if the trust is not terminable
at a fixed time ordinarily the trustee cannot properly make a lease which
will extend beyond the probable period of the trust estate. However,
there are certain circumstances which may justify interpreting the in-
tention of the testator to permit such a lease.' 2 Thus, where owing to
520 PENN. STAT. 717 (1917).6 In re Bentel's Estate, 347 Pa. 237, 32 A.2d 224 (1934) ; Hastings v. Black, 24
N.Y.S. 2d 190 (1941).7Watland v. Good, 189 Iowa 1174, 199 N.W. 613, 61 A.L.R. 1359 (1920).8 In Re Hubbel, supra, note 2, the court mentions that the nature of the trust
property, purposes of the trust, interests of the beneficiaries and other ele-
ments are to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lease,
but seems to rely primarily on the probable duration of the trust estate.
9 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 787 (1948).
10 In re Hubbell, supra, note 2.
1 ERSTATEMENT, TRUSTS, Sec. 189 (a) (b) (c) (d) and (e) (1935).
12 Ibid., Sec. 189 (e). "Among the circumstances which may be material are:
1. Character of the property.
2. Custom with respect to duration of leases of such property in the com-
munity.
3. Inability to procure reasonable rentals for such property for a shorter
term.
4. The disposition of the property to be made at the termination of the
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circumstances not known to the settlor at the time of setting up the trust
it would defeat the purposes of the trust not to permit a long lease
extending beyond the trust period, such a lease may be made with
permission of the court.13 Here, while the probable duration of the
trust estate is an element entering into the concept of reasonableness of
the lease, the controlling element seems to be the intent of the testator.14
Wisconsin seems to put primary emphasis on whether the testator
would have made such a long lease, had he been living at the time it was
executed and had the same information available to the trustee.15 In
determining this issue, consideration is given to the nature of the trust
property, length of leases in the locality, and the interests of the re-
maindermen. Some commentators 6 indicate that the Wisconsin rule is
to the contrary due to the court's decision in a later case. 7 Upon a close
inspecion of this later case, however, it will be found that the Upham
case was not overruled, but that the court expressly followed the rule of
that case and found that the testator probably would not have made the
lease involved.' This case also held that mere pecuniary benefit to the
life beneficiaries was not a sufficient reason to permit a lease which
would extend beyond the probable duration of the trust and thereby
encumber the estate of the remaindermen. 9
It seems that the rule of the principal case and the Wisconsin rule is
the better rule and gives the trustee greater latitude in making the most
advantageous use of trust property. While the rights of the remainder-
men are to be given great consideration and should not be encumbered
unreasonably the test of carrying out the testator's intention seems an
adequate protection. Limiting the lease to the probable duration of the
trust estate will be desirable in most instances but, in some cases, may
prove to be an undue burden to the trustee and prevent him from making
the most advantageous use of the trust property. It seems in most
instances 9 that the requirement of carrying out the testator's intention
will limit the lease to the probable duration of the trust esate, and will
trust, for example, whether it is to be sold or distributed in kind and if
it is to be sold whether the continuation of the lease would impair its
marketability at a fair value."
'3 Supra. note 11, sec. 189 (d).
'1 The Restatement Rule was adopted by statute in California where it is now
provided that the trustee may lease for any reasonable period of time and
that such a lease will not be impaired by termination of the trust estate if
the lease is necessary to carry out the testator's intention. For a discussion
of the California Statute and its effect see 21 So. CA.IF. L. REv. 260 (1948).
'
5 Upham v. Plankinton, supra, note 1.
164 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs 787, 788 (1948) ; and 54 Am. JUR. 473 (1940).
17 Will of Caswell, 197 Wis. 327, 223 N.W. 235, 61 A.L.R. 1369 (1928).28 In re Estate of Gray, 196 Wis. 383, 220 N.W. 175 (1928) was decided in
the term preceding the Caswell case and expressly upheld the Upham case.
19 Will of Caswell, supra, note 17, is one instance where the requirement of
carrying out the testator's intention limited the lease to the probable period
of the trust estate.
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also give the trustee the advantage of leasing for longer periods to the
benefit of both the life beneficiary and the remaindermen, and thereby
carry out the purposes of the trust in those instances where a beneficial
short term lease cannot be made.
Louis R. GILBERT
Trusts - Stock Dividends - Allocation to Income or Corpus -
Testator created a testamentary trust, using as corpus 1300 shares of
stock. Subsequent thereto a stock dividend was declared, increasing the
"corpus" by 1219 shares. The life tenant under the trust brought an
action for a declaratory judgment seeking to have the stock dividend
declared income so as to be distributable to him. Held: In the absence
of any intention to the contrary by the settlor, a stock dividend declared
at a regular director's meeting to be paid from current earnings becomes
part of the corpus, and is not distributable to the life tenant as ordinary
income. Armentrout v. Armentrout, 100 N.E. 2d 555 (Ohio Probate
Court. 1951).
The Ohio court, in the principal case, had little difficulty in justifying
its position because of a well-reasoned earlier Ohio decision which had
clearly established the law in that state.' A study of other jurisdictions,
however, reveals at least a four-way split of authority, with some juris-
dictions following a modified form of one or the other of the four
principal rules. 2 The Massachusetts rule,3 followed in the principal
case, distinguishes between a stock dividend and a cash dividend, and
declares that the stock dividend becomes part of corpus while the cash
dividend goes to income.4 The application of the Massachusetts rule
has been held not to be affected by the fact that the stock dividend is a
regular dividend, although it would seem that this application of the
rule is open to severe criticism. 5 Having once decided that a particular
I Lamb v. Lehmann, 110 Ohio St. 59, 143 N.E. 276, 42 A.L.R. 437 (1924).2 This article is limited to a discussion of the disposition of stock dividends in
the declaring corporation. No attempt is made to discuss the problems pre-
sented by stock rights, liquidating dividends, extraordinary cash dividends,
stock dividends in another corporation etc. For an extensive discussion of
these problems, see the annotation in 130 A.L.R. 486; 1942 Wis. L. REV. 299.
3 Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 96 Am. Dec. 705 (1868).
4 This rule has been adopted in the UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr, § 5,
9A U.L.A. 233.
5 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Tucker, 51 R.I. 507, 155 Atl. 661, 83
A.L.R. 1253 (1931); modified on rehearsing, 52 R.I. 277, 160 Atl. 465, 83
A.L.R. 1259 (1932). Generally stock dividends are considered to be "extra-
ordinary" in nature, i.e., dividends which represent an accumulation of cor-
porate earnings other than those accuring during regular dividend periods,
which are not paid at regular intervals, which are unusual in size etc. When,
as in this Rhode Island case, the Massachusetts rule is applied to an "or-
dinary" or "regular" dividend, and it is the policy of the corporation to de-
clare only "regular" stock dividends, the life tenant will be deprived of all
benefit in the trust. While in the cited case, the court (on rehearing) did give
relief to the life tenant, by stating that it was the duty of the trustee (there
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